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ABSTRACT
The probability of being a crime victim, conditional on
engaging in risky activity, acts like a tax on the risky activity. The
higher the probability, the greater the loss to potential victims in
consumer surplus. Higer conditional probabilities, however, do not
always increase actual crime; sometimes the decrease in risky
activity more than offsets the increase in conditional probability.
Under these circumstances, less crime is associated with greater
welfare loss.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public perception of crime is often decried as misguided or
irrational. Victimization studies, for instance, show that most
serious crime has been declining since 1981 [U. S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 1992], and yet public opinion polls show rising concern
about crime. Similarly, experiments show that people like walking
patrols even when they do not reduce crime.
This note will argue that public perceptions are probably right.
Statistics on crimes actually committed are not the correct
measure of the burden of crime. The correct measure is the
probability of being a victim, conditional on engaging in risky
activity. Increases in conditional victimization probability can lead
to fewer actual crimes if they also cause large reductions in risky
activity, and for plausible parameter values this relationship will
hold. Fewer crimes will be committed, but the burden of crime will
be greater.
The best analogy is the Laffer curve in public finance. Think of
criminal activity as a tax on risky activity-walking in Morningside
Park after dark, leaving your car without an alarm, wearing
expensive jewelry, living in the South Bronx. The conditional
victimization probability is like the tax rate, and the actual number
of crimes is like the revenue that the tax raises. If demand for risky
activity is sufficiently elastic, increases in the "tax rate" above a
certain level will cause "revenue" to fall.
Why would the "tax rate" ever be set so high as to fall on the
wrong side of the Laffer curve? The reason is tragedy of the
commons: noncooperative perpetrators can overuse a common
resource-the willingness of victims to engage in risky activities-
even though a monopolistic criminal syndicate would not. This part
of the story is like the corruption studied by Shleifer and Vishny
[1993] or the criminal industrial organization in Schelling [1967].
The next section sets out the model of victim behavior and
derives the Laffer curve. Section 3 presents a simple model of
perpetrator behavior, and derives the conditions under which
increasing crime is associated with a decreasing burden of crime.
Section 4 concludes.
2. VICTIMS
A representative potential victim must decide how much of the
risky activity to do. Holding her income and the full price of other
activities constant, how much of the risky activity she does depends
on the full price p:
(1) p = pr + 7cC
where pr is the price of the activity in terms of money and t ime-
Becker's [1965] "full price"- and rcC is the expected cost of crime
for each unit of the activity: n is the probability of being victimized
conditional on engaging in one unit of the risky activity, and C is the
cost, in monetary terms, of being victimized.1
Notice that this formulation presumes that all other activities
are safe from crime-just as the usual partial equilibrium analysis
of an excise tax assumes that no other commodities are taxed. If
other activities has varying degrees of danger attached to them, the
algebra would be seriously complicated, but the basic results would
not change. We would just have to use the techniques of cost-
benefit analysis for the situation when several markets have
distortions.
Let D(p) denote the demand function for the risky activity.
Specifically, let
D(p) = a p^, a>0, rj>0
and assume that the risky activity constitutes a small enough share
of total expenditures that income effects can be ignored.
The burden of crime (for potential victims) B is the loss in
consumer surplus associated with the rise in price from pr to pr +
7cC. Obviously, this burden is a function of TC:
Pr
B ( * ) - J D ( p ) d p .
Pr + rcC
It is easy to show:
Proposition 1: The burden of crime is a monotonically
increasing function of the conditional probability of victimization n.
This result does not depend on the particular functional form I
have assumed for the demand curve.
The (expected) number of crimes A(TC) is the product of TC and
the level of risky activity D:
(2) A(TC) = TC D(pr + 7cC).
Differentiating (2) gives the Laffer curve result:
Proposition 2: If
(3) n > 1 +§,
then for
Pr
K > K* =
A(TC) is a decreasing function of n.
Corollary: If (3) holds and n > rc*, increases in n increase the
burden of crime but decrease crime.
From proposition 2 we can see when the Laffer curve result is
likely to hold: when demand is elastic, when the conditional
probability of victimization is large, and when crime is very costly
relative to the normal activity. This is not a bad picture of violent
urban street crime.
3. PERPETRATORS
The equilibrium value of n depends on the actions of
perpetrators as well as those of victims. Let there be a large
number n of identical perpetrators-large enough so that each takes
K and D(K) as given. Each perpetrator i chooses a number of crimes
Aj to commit, and so the total number of crimes is
A = n Aj.
Each perpetrator chooses Aj to maximize a quadratic utility function
yAi2(4) u(Aj) ^ A j - ; ^ ^ , T>0,T>0.
In (4), x is the benefit from committing a crime (generally x<C) and y
represents the cost, including the probability of punishment. D(TT) in
the denominator of (4) represents the increased costs that fewer
victims cause for perpetrators. Obviously, more sophisticated
versions of this relationship are possible; Clotfelter [1978] can be
understood as a catalogue of some of the possibilities. These simple
functional forms, however, are sufficient for our purposes.
From the first-order conditions for utility-maximization, we
can write the number of crimes perpetrators commit as a function
of victim behavior D(TC):
(5) A(K) - j D(*).
Comparing (2) and (5) gives the necessary and sufficient
condition for an internal equilibrium:
Proposition 3: At an internal equilibrium, the conditional
victimization probability is
Y
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium: the supply curve of risky
behavior given by (2) must intersect with the demand curve given by
(5). The demand curve (5) must be a decreasing function of n
(negligible income effects imply that the risky activity cannot be a
Giffen good), while the supply curve (2) can either increase or
decrease. At the intersection, the algebraic slope of (5) must be
smaller than the algebrac slope of (2).
Equilibrium will be on the downward slope of the Laffer curve
if 7i** > n*. Simple algebraic manipulation yields:
Proposition 4: Decreasing crime will be associated with an
increasing burden of crime in the neighborhood of equilibrium if
nx n r
Hence the perverse relationship between actual crime and the
burden of crime is more likely when demand elasticity is large, the
crime is horrible relative to the normal cost of the activity, and the
rewards of crime are large relative to its cost to the perpetrators.
This argument has restricted welfare analysis to the welfare
of potential victims only. Considering the welfare of perpetrators
as well would only strengthen it by making the Laffer curve peak at
a smaller probability of victimization.
Notice that if (6) holds, anticrime measures like increased
incarceration (reducing n and possibly increasing y) and increased
legitimate employment opportunities can make victims better off
even though they increase the amount of crime (more perpetrators
may be in prison or working in legitimate jobs, but the ones who are
not commit more crimes).
4. CONCLUSION
Anticrime measures should not be judged by their effects on
actual crime. Especially for violent street crime, what matters are
the conditional probability of victimization and the associated loss
in consumer surplus.
This conclusion has an important implication. For most
individuals at most times, K is impossible to observe, and doing
experiments could be extremely costly. It seems implausible to
posit a learning process that could lead people to learn n in any
reasonable amount of time. A more natural model would be a multi-
armed bandit (no pun intended) process, in which optimal play does
not surely lead to finding true probabilities. Whether losses are
greater when people are uninformed than when they are informed is
a subject for further work.
NOTE
1. There are (at least) two ways that this particular formula can be
derived from utility maximization.
First, suppose utility is of the form
u(xr, x) - (wxr)G,
where xr is the level of the risky activity, x the level of other
activities, and G is the utility loss from being a crime victim. Let X
denote the marginal utility of (time and money) income and let
C = GA.
First order conditions include
fo~ = X (pr +n C),
and so (pr +TT C) can be treated as the price of the risky activity.
Alternatively, let the utility function be standard, without
crime entering into it directly, but let crime reduce income by C.
Then if the potential victim is sufficiently insured that she faces an
expected income constraint, (1) also follows.
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